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La pièce Man in the Moone de Francis Godwin et celle de Margaret Cavendish, 
Blazing World, décrivent des mondes nouveaux qui dérivent de l’ idée de paradis 
et qui expérimentent avec les limites spatiales et temporelles. En combinant la 
nouveauté et une connaissance actuelle afin de construire un paradis imaginaire 
et un protagoniste qui obtient l’ accès à un espace édénique, Godwin et Cavendish 
expérimentent différentes façons, spécifiquement masculines et féminines, de cons-
truire la connaissance au paradis. Ces explorations épistémologiques, manifestes 
dans la découverte de Godwin du monde extérieur, ainsi que dans la création de 
Cavendish d’ un soi intérieur, alors qu’ ils tentent de réconcilier la connaissance 
d’ avant et d’ après la faute originelle, développent des dichotomies relevant du sexe 
que semblent établir ces textes. En utilisant un cadre géographique humaniste, on 
compare les épistémologies des deux auteurs en tant que cultures divergentes de 
la nouveauté, afin de montrer comment Godwin et Cavendish s’ orientent dans 
les géographies qu’ ils ont choisies. Les récits qui en résultent explorent dans quelle 
mesure le passé nuit aux possibilités du paradis, et comment ce conflit entre passé 
et présent relève du sexe ; ce qui permet de mieux comprendre comment le nou-
veau et l’ ancien fonctionnent et construisent des façons spécifiquement mascu-
lines et féminines de connaître et de se situer pour chaque auteur et leurs lecteurs. 
The history of early modern utopia-making reflects in large part the strug-gle to regain a lost paradise in the potential afforded by the discovery of the 
New World. In their own whimsical ways, the posthumously published Man 
in the Moone (1638), by Bishop Francis Godwin of Hereford, and The Descrip-
tion of a New World, Called the Blazing World (1666), by Margaret Cavendish, 
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Duchess of Newcastle, reconfigure the utopian space as versions of the Biblical 
paradise. In what relatively little has been written about Godwin’s account of a 
fictional voyage to the moon, it has been read as an early example of science fic-
tion, a study of language that contributed to the universal-language movement 
of the seventeenth century, as well as yet another work in a long (masculine) 
tradition of lunar utopia-making.1 The more comprehensively explored Blazing 
World, at once a utopian text and an experiment in generic hybridity, has been 
read as a response to the scientific and philosophical debates in Cavendish’s day, 
a retreat from the horrors of the Civil War into an interior world, and a narra-
tive of female power.2 By putting these two texts in dialogue, I hope to trouble 
the gender dichotomies they seem to establish.
Critics have discussed the feminization and sexualization of discovered 
lands, examining early modern writers who use a gendered rhetoric of discov-
ery that dichotomizes the male discoverer and the female discovered.3 I want to 
extend this discussion on gender and world-finding/world-making by looking 
at the ways in which the epistemologies of knowledge acquisition themselves 
can be seen as gendered, through a comparison of Godwin’s and Cavendish’s 
accounts of finding or creating paradise. Godwin’s moon and Cavendish’s 
Blazing World are imagined geographical sites in which the old and the new 
intersect; both are labelled as paradise and are thus saturated with the history 
of Adam and Eve’s Eden while also charged with the utopian uncertainty of the 
new, the unknown, and the ideal. In their attempts to reconcile history and the 
new, Godwin and Cavendish speak to the complicated relationship between 
our human past, tainted by the repercussions of the Biblical Fall, and our hope 
for a better world. However, a key distinction between the two accounts of a 
new paradise is how such paradises come to be (known). Godwin moves his 
protagonist outward toward the discovery of the external world; Cavendish’s 
protagonist moves inward toward the creation of an interior world. Both epis-
temologies, that of discovery and that of creation, can be seen as gendered 
strategies for acquiring new knowledge of time and place, ways of knowing that 
maintained or undermined the status quo. 
I thus use the terms “discovery” and “creation” to refer to what I think can 
be seen as divergent processes of acquiring such knowledge, and a discussion 
of the nuances of these terms will help to situate my study. New knowledge 
that is discovered is historical in the sense that its origins belong to/in the past; 
the literal dis-covering/uncovering of a truth presupposes its preexistence. New 
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knowledge that is created, on the other hand, is knowledge that has been newly 
constructed and did not previously exist; created knowledge comprises a new-
ness that departs from the preexistent. The distinction I wish to make between 
discovery and creation is one that goes beyond genre or discipline to consider 
both the spatial and historical implications of gendered ways of knowing/dis-
covering/creating paradise. In doing so my aim is to respond to geographer 
Yi-Fu Tuan’s call for a kind of humanist geography:
The broad aim of the humanist geographer must be: Given human nature 
and the direct experience of space and place in the ordinary world, how 
can man have conceived different worlds, more or less abstract, among 
which being the maps of utopia and the geographer’s own concepts of 
location?4
My work addresses this question by using a humanist geographical framework 
to explore the relationship of early modern men and women to their time and 
their place during a period when new worlds and old worlds were at the fore-
front of human imagination. Humans migrate not only when pushed, but also 
“under the lure of a pull — that is, when they envisage a place ‘out there’ — say, 
the New World — that is more attractive. Or they may decide to stay put in the 
Old World.”5 In the utopia-as-paradise, a world characterized by the human 
desire to overcome our post-lapsarian state, Godwin and Cavendish use what 
Donald R. Maxwell terms the “divergent cultures of discovery and creation,” 
and what I reconceptualize as divergent cultures of newness, to explore new 
realities/geographies that, in their very fictiveness, allow for an emphasis on 
how we know — empirically and intuitively.6
To begin, I code Baconian empiricism as a product of a masculine en-
deavour to learn about the world, using the new scientific methods that were 
established in the male-dominated fields of science and philosophy in the 
seventeenth century. By pitting an intuitive way of knowing against this em-
pirical mode as a point of contrast and aligning it with the moves Cavendish 
makes — aligning it, that is, with her subjective approach to reasoning in op-
position to the objective and inductive approach of her Royal Society peers in 
the new experimentalism — I push the gendering of discovery beyond the dis-
covering/discovered gender binary to read discovering and creating as compet-
ing gendered epistemologies. Whereas Godwin perceives locatable precision 
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and accuracy as providing a power of privileged knowing through space and 
time, Cavendish promotes a creative and flexible knowledge construction in 
her Blazing World that emphasizes the promise of potentiality beyond temporal 
and spatial constraints. However, while the methodologies they use to acquire 
knowledge and to construct newness are largely informed, and perhaps limited, 
by their gendered relationships to their place and time, these methodologies 
end up troubling the gendered dichotomy they claim to adhere to. The resulting 
narratives explore the extent to which the past gets in the way of potential in 
paradise and how that conflict between past and present is gendered. Tracing 
the ways in which Godwin and Cavendish navigate through the geographies 
they have chosen and comparing their epistemologies give us a better under-
standing of the ways in which the new and the old functioned to construct a 
gendered way of knowing and locating for each author and for their readers. In 
doing so, my goal is to bring attention to how Godwin’s underexplored whimsi-
cal fiction identified and troubled masculine-coded knowing as well as to con-
tribute what I hope will be a new way of considering the efficacy of Cavendish’s 
epistemology for her female ruler in light of the wealth of scholarship that has 
thus far explored the protofeminist implications of her Blazing World.
Origins, history, and identity
A curious feature of the title page of the first edition of The Man in the Moone 
(1638) is its misleading by-line, which claims that the ensuing account of “The 
Man in the Moone: or A Discourse of a Voyage thither” is by one Domingo 
Gonsales, “The speedy Messenger.” As we learn, the narrative is written as a 
first-person travel account by a Domingo Gonsales who will give us the story of 
his origins. We now know that Domingo Gonsales is the name of the fictional 
protagonist of the story, and that Francis Godwin, bishop of Llandaff and of 
Hereford, is the author of the work. Figure 1 shows us this emendation written 
into the title-page of the 1638 copy at Harvard:  
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Figure 1. Above “Domingo Gonsales” (printed) is written in “Dr Francis Godwin Bp of 
Landalff,” possibly by a near-contemporary reader, in the first edition of The Man in the 
Moone. STC 11943.5, Houghton Library, Harvard University.
It is unclear whether this meant that Godwin’s authorship was common 
knowledge during the time of publication. However, the inscription of his 
name into the title page certainly indicates the urge to attribute real or actual 
authorship to the work. This may have led to the change in the title page in the 
second edition of the work, published in 1657, in which the printed by-line 
reads “By F. G. B. of H.,” which presumably stands for “Francis Godwin Bishop 
of Hereford” in full. 
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Figure 2. Title page and frontispiece of the second edition. The by-line no longer reads 
“Domingo Gonsales”; rather, we are given Francis Godwin’s initials. Image courtesy of 
the Huntington Library, San Marino, California.
The re-attribution of authorship from the fictional Domingo Gonsales to the 
actual Godwin is at once a correction and an obfuscation; a fictitiously “known” 
persona has been replaced by the rather enigmatic initials of a real figure, one 
who is identified by his geographical ties and his status in the church. Again, 
whether this is a correction of the misleading by-line of the first edition or a 
clarification of the author as a separate persona from the fictional narrator is 
unknown.
But regardless, these fictional layers of identity play with the authenticity 
and authentication of the account and its origins.7 In the first edition, we are led to 
believe that the author and protagonist are one and the same. Our introductory 
image of Domingo Gonsales in the accompanying frontispiece places him in 
our imagination as already in transition, in between spaces  —  somewhere 
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outside of, going to, or coming from the moon. The image is a quirky engraving 
of a little man being carried up by a flock of birds, holding him by a strange 
contraption, above a small hill or mountain. He is the “little eye-witnesse, our 
great discoverer,” Domingo Gonsales of Spain: little in terms of stature — and 
this will become one of his defining characteristics — and great in terms of 
his potential contribution to human knowledge.8 We have begun to discover 
who Gonsales is, from the frontispiece and the title page, but we learn from 
our first introduction to Gonsales as narrator that the first thing he wants us 
to know is that he is someone who is already known in his home region: “It 
is well enough and sufficiently known to all the countries of Andaluzia that 
I Domingo Gonsales was born of Noble parentage, and that in the renowned 
City of Sivill, to wit in the year 1552.”9 Our protagonist is thus immediately 
introduced to us by a name, a location, and a history. Not only is he situated 
spatially and historically, but we are given his full name as well as the details of 
his origins, his noble background, and his genealogy, allowing us to locate him 
on the spectrum of his family’s individual history:
my Fathers name being Therrando Gonsales (that was near kinsman 
by the mothers side until Don Pedro Sanchez that worthy Count of 
Almenara), and as for my Mother, she was the daughter of the Reverend 
and famous Lawyer, Otho Perez de Sallaveda, Governour of Barcellona, 
and Corrigidor of Biscaia.10
Gonsales’s acts of naming connect him not only regionally but genealogically to 
an extended network of relatives of public note: famed lawyers, governors, and 
so on. Naming becomes a matter of memory, looking backward in time to key 
figures, specific famous — “known” — individuals with whom to identify in an 
attempt to historically authenticate one’s past and, subsequently, to affix one’s 
present identity. In confirming his present via the past, Gonsales shows us that 
his claim to fame derives from his origins and his history.
Godwin’s desire to provide us with such detail about Gonsales’s history 
suggests that his idea of knowing is one verified by history and measured by 
completeness. The distinction I want to make here is that this state of com-
pletion specifically refers to the verifiable completion of external knowledge. 
Godwin presents knowing through Gonsales as the ability externally to locate 
and pinpoint, to name and to identify, by virtue of the specificity with which 
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Gonsales can be located and mapped onto a timeline and into a national con-
text, discovered unto us as a kind of historical figure of note. In his note to 
the reader, Godwin describes the ensuing account as “a new discovery of a 
new World [emphasis mine]” and compares it to Columbus’s actual “espyall 
of America,” a discovery that proved the existence of a new world which had 
until then been unknown.11 Through this comparison, Godwin attempts to 
situate his narrative in the realm of the possible and the real, authenticating 
his authority by situating himself alongside the historically famous figure of 
Columbus. Columbus’s discovery of the Americas and Gonsales’s comparable 
discovery of the lunar paradise are a testament to how “the then unknown” can 
be brought into knowledge “as all other of the known World” by discovery, in 
the way that other scientific and geographical discoveries have extended what 
we know about our world.12 Through the same external verification of facts, 
geographical and historical, we get a sense of Gonsales’s origins and can place 
him as a product of those origins.
That Godwin attaches such significance to historical data as a means of 
authenticating his investment in the possibilities afforded by discovery likely 
draws from his own historical training. Mary Baine Campbell suggests that 
Godwin may have first drafted The Man in the Moone while a student at Ox-
ford after hearing Giordano Bruno give a lecture on the plurality of worlds.13 A 
bishop and a historian, Godwin would later imbue his most well-known works 
with his extensively informed historical background. Of these historical works, 
for which he is principally remembered, the most significant was his Catalogue 
of the bishops of England (1601), a named listing of English bishops complete 
with “a briefe history of their lives and memorable actions, so neere as can be 
gathered out of antiquity.”14 Godwin’s other works were of the same design, for 
example his unpublished catalogue of bishops of Bath and Wells, dated 1594, 
containing an even more detailed account of the bishops’ lives. In these works, 
Godwin’s primary purpose was to record history through the naming of male 
religious figures and by identifying the events, dates, and places of their histo-
ries.
What we can identify as Godwin’s historicism and antiquarianism thus 
likely contributed to the historical dependency of his protagonist Gonsales. 
Godwin refers to historical events that place his protagonist’s life at a specific 
point in the sixteenth century. Grant McColley, noting that Godwin’s narration 
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“is built upon and within a structure of actual historical events,” has traced the 
trajectory of the fictional Domingo Gonsales’s life:
This union [between narration and actual historical events] begins with 
the opening of the tale, where Domingo in 1568–69 abandons his studies 
at the University of Salamanca to participate in the conflict then raging 
intermittently in the Low Countries. Historical contact is continued by 
the return of Gonsales in 1573 with the Duke of Alva, by reference to the 
battle off the Isle of Pines in 1596, by the inclusion of an unidentified and 
perhaps fictitious minor engagement between other ships of Spain and 
England, by the request of Pylonas in 1601 that the returning Gonsales 
give his felicitations to Queen Elizabeth, and, in conclusion, by Domingo’s 
meeting and fraternizing, ‘many months’ later, with the Jesuit Father who 
had entered Peking on January 24, 1601.15
By making specific reference to actual historical events and figures in the 
timeline of Gonsales’s life, Godwin constructs a credible history for Gonsales, 
grounding his protagonist’s narrative in a kind of historical realism. Gonsales 
is discovered unto us by means of male-coded markers of identity that were 
historical, genealogical, and patriarchal. The specific names we are given locate 
his family through the patriarchal lines and regions from whence they hail, 
suggesting that the value in complete, precise knowing can be coded as male-
oriented, and that location determines male identity.
In contrast to Godwin’s named, known, and situated protagonist, 
Cavendish’s protagonist, the Lady, is unnamed and unsituated  —  that is, 
according to the precise terms of Godwin’s idea of knowing. The Lady either lacks 
the verifiable origins that Gonsales has, or such origins remain undiscovered to 
us. The very lack of a name seems deliberate, suggesting Cavendish’s interest in 
the limitlessness of this “unknown” identity. The Lady’s namelessness and her 
unspecified origins allow for her to be any female protagonist of a romance. 
She is first introduced to us through a man’s eyes, a merchant who “travelling 
into a foreign Country, fell extreamly in Love” with the Lady.16 Reference to 
her status is made only in relation to his: the merchant is a “stranger in that 
Nation, and beneath [the lady] both in Birth and Wealth.”17 The male merchant 
discovers the Lady, which at first troublingly parallels the gendered dichotomy 
of the masculine discoverer and his feminized/ravished lands. In this case, 
122 jennifer mi-young park
however, the Lady, though discovered, is not ravished; rather, significantly, she 
preserves her virtue. We eventually lose the merchant, and we learn that it is the 
Lady who occupies a privileged status in Cavendish’s narrative; the men who 
have abducted her die off, “the young Lady only, by the light of her beauty, the 
heat of her youth, and protection of the gods, remaining alive.”18 Her virtuous 
qualities preserve her and suggest her potential for further development. The 
Lady’s geographical or genealogical origins are not essential to her identity in 
the way Gonsales’s origins are; rather, that her origins remain unknown allows 
for the Lady’s identity to be constructed by her present moment, unburdened 
by the details of her history.
In her “Epistle to the Reader,” Cavendish characterizes her narrative as “a 
description of a new world, not such as Lucian’s, or the French-man’s world in 
the moon; but a world of my own creating, which I call the Blazing World.”19 
Contrary to Godwin who wishes to align his aims with those of Columbus, 
Cavendish’s goal is to distinguish her project from those that have come before 
hers in the male-dominated utopian tradition. Her emphasis on creation 
suggests that she sees the act of creating as a means of departure — a gendered 
departure for Cavendish, who claims she is “not covetous,” but “is ambitious as 
ever any of my sex was, is, or can be.”20 Her ambition, as she makes explicit, is to 
be “Margaret the First” — to be known and to begin her own line, of which she 
is the original. Her creation of a new world allows her to evade the problems of 
origin and history as well as of her present moment, all of which have served 
to exile her. In constructing a new narrative as “Margaret the First,” Cavendish 
offers the act of creation as an act of empowerment, for herself and for her 
readers: rather than “not to be mistress of [a world] since Fortune and the Fates 
would give me none, I have made a world of my own: for which no body, I hope, 
will blame me, since it is in every one’s power to do the like.”21
When her Blazing World was published as an addendum to her 
Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, Cavendish deliberately entered 
into male-dominated philosophical and scientific circles with what scholars 
have argued may have been a type of proto-feminist agenda. Deborah Boyle 
rejects the possibility that Cavendish’s views contributed to a “feminine mode 
of knowing,” but I see Cavendish as arguing for an internal processing that 
made sense for her status as a woman.22 At the same time, she was concerned 
with rationalizing her and her husband’s place in history; Cavendish’s interest 
in the popular atomism and her later belief in a kind of organic vitalist 
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materialism both came out of her desire for an explanation of the “political 
and psychological conflict that surrounded her.”23 Cavendish’s materialism, in 
which matter “remains eternal and infinite,” combines in complicated ways 
with her Royalism to produce her outlook on history. Royalism, according to 
J. C. Davis, was seen as “utopian during the Interregnum, ideological any other 
time.”24 Her resulting epistemology is a creative knowledge construction that 
allows her to exercise the liberty of departing from the current state of things. 
Cavendish’s creativity does not depend on an external standard of verifiability; 
rather, her internal creations are “an issue of man’s Fancy, framed in his own 
Mind, according as he pleases, without regard, whether the thing, he fancies, 
be really existent without his mind or not.”25 While this detached, internal 
creativity has the flavour of escapism, we find that there is a virtue in following 
Cavendish’s line, not simply in forgetting a past (or present), but in constructing 
a past anew, amassing unrealized memories, building an alternative past from 
or in place of a former one. Cavendish consciously and intentionally creates a 
new paradise narrative that replaces the old one.
Paradise and the limitations of the past
And the LORD God planted a garden eastward in Eden; and there he put 
the man whom he had formed.
–Genesis 2:8, King James Bible
“If geometrical space is a relatively late and sophisticated cultural construct,” 
Tuan asks, “what is the nature of man’s original pact with his world, his original 
space?”26 His answer as a humanist geographer is that “original space possesses 
structure and orientation by virtue of the presence of the human body. Body 
implicates space; space coexists with the sentient body.”27 Tuan’s sketch of the 
relationship between the human body and the space it inhabits is useful for 
thinking about paradise as humanity’s original space. In Genesis, the Garden of 
Eden is thought to be paradise, the first and original place given to our human 
ancestors. According to Alessandro Scafi, “in the Hebrew version of Genesis, the 
Garden of Eden is described as being placed miqedem, a term that refers to both 
time and space: the garden is both ‘at the beginning’ and ‘in the east.’ ”28 Thus, 
paradise, positioned “at the beginning” according to its original definition, is a 
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place of origin. In contrast, paradise in Godwin’s and Cavendish’s texts serves 
as a place not of origin but rather of destination.
As Gonsales ventures from his place of origin, he encounters on one of his 
first destinations an earthly version of paradise: the Isle of St. Helena, “the only 
paradice, I think,” remarks Gonsales, “that the Earth yieldeth.”29 As an island, 
it seems “a miracle of Nature, that out of so huge and tempestuous an Ocean, 
such a little piece of ground should arise and discover it self.”30 Gonsales’s first 
encounter with a paradise matches the travel narrative of the age of discovery 
during which the earthly paradise was sought with the hope that it could be 
mapped. According to Scafi, the cartography of paradise and the mapping of 
its location changed the reality of the world by “incorporat[ing] Eden” into 
that reality.31 Soon it was no longer sufficient merely to “evoke Earthly Para-
dise”; rather, by incorporating the idea of a locatable paradise into our human 
reality, discoverers wanted to know “on which longitude and latitude it was to 
be found, and to determine the characteristics of the planet on that spot.”32 It 
became a manifestation of the human desire to discover as a form of conquest: 
“The explorers of the Renaissance were not content simply to believe, they 
wanted to verify, explain, prove.”33
But for all their obsession with the physical/geographical discovery of 
paradise to the external eye, cartographers and mapmakers never portrayed 
the “internal geographical space” of paradise. Between the fifteenth and six-
teenth centuries, the Garden of Eden began to disappear from world maps with 
the discovery of “new worlds” on earth. Increasing numbers of reports from 
travellers returning from the East “failed to confirm the material existence of 
an Earthly Paradise in eastern Asia,” leaving Europeans frustrated with the fi-
nite nature of the world and the “failure” of discovery to uncover paradise on 
Earth.34 Boundaries needed to be extended. For Godwin’s Gonsales, whose Isle 
of St. Helena was merely an earthly paradise, those boundaries extended to 
space: to the moon and the discovery of a paradise there. 
But as an imperfect guide who is implicated in human history and fallen-
ness, Gonsales is burdened by a past that limits his liberty and restricts his 
actions both in and on the way to the lunar paradise. In particular, and perhaps 
most significantly, these restrictions take the form of language barriers. In tran-
sit, Gonsales is intercepted by wicked spirits who appear to him as “Illusions of 
the Devils” and come “speaking divers kindes of Languages which I understood 
not.”35 The devils appear to experiment with different tongues in an attempt to 
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communicate with Gonsales and to tempt him into following their orders; it 
is not until Gonsales hears “them that spake very good Spanish, some Dutch, 
and other some Italian, for all these languages I understood,” that he manages 
to interact with them. The confusing cacophony of languages spoken by the 
devils and the temptation of Gonsales integrate the confusion of Babel with 
their temptation of Adam and Eve by the Devil. Gonsales thus seems either to 
be travelling back in time on his journey toward a pre-lapsarian past-space or 
bringing the burdens of the post-lapsarian past with him. His interactions with 
the wicked spirits, rather than preparing him for his entrance into the lunar 
paradise, serve instead to illustrate exactly the kinds of difficulties Gonsales 
will undergo there.
As a man, Gonsales’s power is tied to his history, his region, and his 
origins; on the moon, however, his historical and regional identities do not 
serve to provide him with any advantage and instead impede his navigational 
progress. Learning (or perhaps re-learning) the language of paradise becomes 
a marker of time and the key to accessing the spaces and places of paradise, but 
for Gonsales, language is an obstacle to navigating this geography. Gonsales 
first begins to learn the lunar language when he learns the name of the prince 
of the region, the “Adam” figure who resides in the lunar world. This act of 
naming, or more accurately learning the name of, Pylonas gives us our first 
description of the lunar language: he is called Pylonas, “as neere as I can by 
Letters declare it, for their sounds are not perfectly expressed by our charac-
ters.” The name Pylonas “signifieth in their Language, First, if perhaps it be not 
rather a denotation of his dignity and authority, as being the prime Man in all 
those parts.”36 As “First” and “prime Man,” Pylonas’s role in the moon echoes 
Adam’s role in Eden, and his natural tongue is the lunar, or “paradise,” language. 
The lunar language as a paradisiacal language is reminiscent of the original 
pre-lapsarian language of Adam and Eve. All the inhabitants of the moon use 
the language and can understand each other. Gonsales, representative of our 
fallen human state, can recognize its universality although he himself cannot 
attain full access to it. Although Gonsales is inferior to the lunars because he is 
human, Pylonas does grant him enough privilege to be allowed to learn some 
of the lunar culture, including, as much as he can, the language. Gonsales’s ac-
quisition of the language, however, is impeded not only by his inferior status 
but also by his natural human abilities. The very newness of the language is an 
obstacle for Gonsales, who must depend on languages he already knows as a 
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point of reference: “The Difficulty of that language is not to be conceived,” he 
explains, “and the reasons thereof are especially… because it hath no affinitie 
with any other that I ever heard.”37 The reliance on his own repository of past 
knowledge already renders him incapable of acquiring the language with ease, 
and his struggle is compounded by the utter inadequacy of human means to 
express the language at all. The language “consisteth not so much of words and 
Letters, as of tunes and uncouth sounds, that no letters can express.”38
Gonsales’s struggles with the lunar language are echoed in broader 
seventeenth-century concerns with the fallibility of human language. If human 
knowledge is transmitted through language, and language transmitted and 
understood via the written word, here Gonsales faces knowledge that extends 
beyond the boundaries of the written word, and he struggles to acquire that 
new knowledge, to describe it, and to master it. A primary tension in Gonsales’s 
experience of the lunar paradise is the indescribability of things, the inability 
of language to support the knowledge of certain lunar things, confounded 
by his desire for precision in description. This is perhaps best exemplified in 
what Campbell describes as “the most wonderful and pleasurable moment in 
[Gonsales’s] representation of the Moon”39 — his description of the lunar colour: 
neither blacke nor white, yellow nor redd, greene nor blue, nor any colour 
composed of these… it was a colour never seen in our earthly world, and 
therefore neither to be described unto us by any, nor to be conceived of 
one that never saw it.40 
Godwin’s earthly language fails him at this moment as he searches for the names 
of colours he knows, only to dismiss them; the only way to describe the lunar 
colour is to describe what it is not. Likewise, the lunar language has no earthly 
alternative and thus cannot be described or located by earthly means. Instead, 
Gonsales still must point to external markers, like using musical notation, to 
attempt to describe the language as much as he can to his human readership, to 
“locate” the language using whatever coordinates in human knowledge might 
apply.41
Like Gonsales, Cavendish’s Lady, too, goes through a trial period during 
which she endeavours to learn the new language of the Blazing World, but un-
like Gonsales, the Lady eventually manages to attain a kind of fluency in the 
language of the Blazing World. The process of learning the language at first 
Navigating Past, Potential, and Paradise 127
belies a human limitation for her; the new language is not something she picks 
up intuitively, but something she must learn with time. But unlike Gonsales, 
she picks up the language fairly quickly in the process of approaching Paradise, 
which as she will learn is the central city toward which she is being led. The 
stages of learning the language toward fluency parallel the geographical naviga-
tion toward the centre of Paradise, during which the Lady “endeavour[s] to 
learn their language; which after she had obtained so far, that partly by some 
words and signs she was able to apprehend their meaning,” quickly learning to 
speak and understand as she draws closer to her destination.42
By the time the Lady reaches the city of Paradise, the seat of the Emperor, 
she has acquired sufficient proficiency in the language to allow her access into 
the interior spaces of the Blazing World, where she acquires a new identity and 
a privileged status as part of her new role in this new world:
No sooner was the Lady brought before the Emperor, but he conceived 
her to be some goddess, and offered to worship her; which she refused, 
telling him, (for by that time she had pretty well learned their language) 
that although she came out of another world, yet she was but a mortal; at 
which the Emperor rejoicing, made her his wife, and gave her an absolute 
power to rule and govern all that world as she pleased. But her subjects, 
who could hardly be persuaded to believe her mortal, tendered her all the 
veneration and worship due to a deity. … she was made Empress.43
Cavendish gives us indications of the Lady’s linguistic progress: where once 
she “partly by some words and signs… was able to apprehend their meaning,” 
now the Lady “by that time… had pretty well learned their language.” At the 
moment of what may be an advanced proficiency of the language, the Lady uses 
her linguistic abilities to communicate that she is only mortal. The Emperor, 
however, rather than register her mortality as an indicator of inferior status, 
rejoices at this and instead bestows upon her divine status and her new identity 
as Empress. 
Now as Empress, she has presumably reached the final stage of fluency, as 
she is free to exercise her subjectivity and to put it in dialogue with others. Once 
she attains this implicit fluency, the Empress’s interactions with the inhabitants 
of the Blazing World are unhampered by the limitations of unfamiliar or 
translated language. Any reference to the language itself, much less to the 
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Lady’s prior difficulties in acquiring it, is completely gone. The language has no 
specifics; we can assume that because the Empress is in the Blazing World she 
is using the language in these conversations, but there is no further reference 
to the language itself. The language has instead been stripped down/relegated 
to its most pure and unadulterated form — its function as a tool, singular and 
absolute, used to (successfully) explore epistemological questions.44
In both Godwin’s and Cavendish’s narratives, the protagonists must learn 
a new, universal language — one that recalls the original language — in order 
to access, and participate in, the spaces of paradise.45 Each author’s approach 
to language speaks to gendered differences in what constitutes knowing. For 
Gonsales, naming is knowing: proof of knowing is demonstrated externally by 
the ability to name. For Cavendish’s Empress, knowledge seems to constitute, 
and to require, something else. Naming appears rather to get in the way of 
gaining knowledge; instead, doing away with language consequently allows her 
to pursue lines of inquiry without the problems of untranslatability. Cavendish’s 
response is thus to bypass the curse of Babel altogether; by eliminating the 
problem of language, Cavendish is able to use the Empress’s subjectivity to 
explore the limits of her knowledge of the world around her, to promote a 
way of knowing that may be gained dialectically, but which percolates in the 
solitude of the mind. In this way, Cavendish seems primarily interested in a 
knowledge construction independent of external labelling and instead directed 
internally while simultaneously doing away with boundaries; for Cavendish, 
the boundaries within which to locate paradise extend infinitely inward to 
newly created places of the mind. As a result, she assesses the spaces in paradise 
and the possibilities for knowing and being known therein. 
Forgetting (history)
Godwin’s paradises, including the lunar paradise, are always simulacra. We re-
alize this when we recognize that Godwin names and locates everything, except 
the paradise. Paradise is a point of reference rather than the original human 
space, and Godwin’s pseudo-paradises correspondingly adhere to the temporal 
regulations of “reality.” The culture of discovery seems not to allow for new 
truths to be constructed outside of the boundaries of what we know about time 
and space, and we see Gonsales come up against these limitations. His frequent 
Navigating Past, Potential, and Paradise 129
mention of the memory of his wife and children back home and his promises to 
tell his account of his journey upon his return show that he remains attached to 
a “home” he has left behind in the real world, his place of origin where his iden-
tity grants him a certain amount of power and privilege. He teases his readers 
that they will learn “most rare and incredible secrets of Nature” upon his return:
You shall then see men to flie from place to place in the ayre; you shall be 
able, (without moving or travelling of any creature,) to send messages in 
an instant many Miles off, and receive answer again imediately; you shall 
be able to declare your minde presently unto your friend, being in some 
private and remote place of a populous Citie, with a number of such like 
things: but that which far surpasseth all the rest, you shall have notice of 
a new World, of many most rare and incredible secrets of Nature, that all 
the Philosophers of former ages could never so much as dream of.46
But Gonsales himself never actually returns home and thus never fulfills the 
promises he makes in his account. While Gonsales’s discoveries are hopeful 
in their Baconian promise to expand human potential, The Man in the Moone 
ends with Gonsales’s arrival in China, where he is ultimately held captive in a 
post-lapsarian world that is perhaps irredeemable; in a sense, he falls from the 
paradise of the moon. As a result, we never gain the promised knowledge that 
would enable that human progress he imagines, those things he alludes to but 
fails to disclose. His own teleological understanding of time leads to his pre-
mapped narrative which, paradoxically, is ultimately left unfinished. Gonsales’s 
knowledge, grounded in history and a privileged status dependent on that his-
tory, is ultimately one that isn’t given a future.
In contrast, the overlapping of the Empress’s present location and the 
site of the actual paradise of Adam and Eve complicates time and space in 
Cavendish’s Blazing World. The Empress finds out the history of her present 
paradise inadvertently, in the process of her epistemological exploration of 
the Blazing World. Upon asking the spirits of the Blazing World “where the 
Paradise was, whether it was in the midst of the world as a centre of pleasure? 
or whether it was the whole world, or a peculiar world by itself… ?” she learns 
that paradise “was not in the world she came from, but in that world she lived 
in at present; and that it was the very same place where she kept her court, and 
where her palace stood, in the midst of the imperial city.”47 She then inquires 
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about the first couple, “whither Adam fled when he was driven out of the 
Paradise?” — to which the spirits inform her, “Out of this world… you are now 
Empress of, into the world you came from.”48 In this surprising reversal of the 
pre- and post-lapsarian worlds, Cavendish privileges her Empress over Adam 
and Eve; paradise is now defined by the presence of the Empress.
Cavendish thus replaces the paradise narrative of Adam and Eve with a 
new re-interpretation of her own. Her desire to assert her own interpretation 
on divine truths appears in the form of the Empress’s desire to “make a 
Cabbala” — specifically, “The Jews’ Cabbala.”49 At this extraordinary turning 
point in the narrative, the point at which the Empress’s curiosity about the 
world around her culminates in her desire to write her own Cabbala, Margaret 
Cavendish as the Duchess of Newcastle “appears in the text as a character”50 
to serve as a scribe for the Empress who is herself, as we have gathered, an 
imagined persona/extension of Cavendish. The word Cabbala, or alternatively 
Kabbalah, is applied to “the pretended tradition of the mystical interpretation 
of the Old Testament,” originally defined as the name “given in post-biblical 
Hebrew to the oral tradition handed down from Moses to the Rabbis of the 
Mishnah and the Talmud.”51 Jonathan Gil Harris sees evidence of Cavendish’s 
“desire to form slantwise partnerships across space, culture, and time” in the 
connection between the “new world” of the Blazing World — Cavendish’s “self-
conscious rewriting of old worlds” — and her “Jewish Cabbala”: 
Cavendish’s Jewish Cabbala implies a different temporality — conjunction 
with an antique yet living Jewishness that, rather than serving as western 
tradition’s obsolete past or exploding it from within, nests inside and 
reanimates it.52
Cavendish’s desire to make a Cabbala comes from a desire for a different kind 
of temporality, but one that I see as emphasizing a blatant rewriting that pri-
oritizes the new, and thus a replacement of the old rather than an integration 
of the old with the new. The Duchess informs the Empress that she would have 
to look elsewhere to be “instruct[ed] in that mystery [of the Jews’ Cabbala]” if 
that was indeed what the Empress wanted to write. Alternately, after rejecting 
the Empress’s inquiries about writing a “philosophical Cabbala,” a “moral Cab-
bala,” and a “political Cabbala,” for those all “required no further Cabbala,” the 
Duchess’s suggestion is that “if your Majesty were resolved to make a Cabbala, 
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I would advise you, rather to make a poetical or romancical Cabbala, wherein 
you can use metaphors, allegories, similitudes, etc. and interpret them as you 
please [emphasis mine].”53 The solution, it seems, is the freedom to interpret 
through the creation of a Cabbala of an escapist rather than realist genre, but 
which as a result allows for new interpretations in place of existing ones. Thus 
the Empress finds a solution for her ambitions. 
The Duchess, however, then voices her own ambitions: to be Empress of 
a world herself. Here, too, the freedom of a creative/created newness provides a 
solution. The spirits inform the Duchess and the Empress that “you can create 
your self a celestial world if you please,” or any other world, and it is thus that 
both the Empress and the Duchess learn of the creative power to make, rather 
than discover, new worlds:
What, said the Empress, can any mortal be a creator? Yes, answered the 
spirits; for every human creature can create an immaterial world fully 
inhabited by immaterial creatures, and populous of immaterial subjects, 
such as we are, and all this within the compass of the head or scull.54
This solution is pleasing to the Duchess, who herself is an advocate of an indi-
vidual’s right to interpret freely, given her/Cavendish’s actual fraught relation-
ship with her past and present situation in history. “I’ll take your advice,” the 
Duchess decides, “reject and despise all the worlds without me, and create a 
world of my own.”55
How does one replace the old narrative of a place with a new one? 
Cavendish’s suggestion of an infinite interior allows for an almost unbounded 
“space” within which to explore human capacity for knowledge, one that does 
not or need not conform to the constraints of time or the preconceptions of 
external reality. Her creative version of knowledge construction disregards the 
subdivisions of time so as to eliminate the telos of the past dictating what is and 
what is to come. Cavendish wants history to be free from repeating itself, and 
her interior creativity allows for a temporality other than what we know. In a 
conversation the Empress has with the spirits of the Blazing World, she explores 
just these temporal (im)possibilities:
can spirits forget? Yes, said the spirits; for what is past, is only kept in 
memory, if it be not recorded. I did believe, said the Empress, that spirits 
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had no need of memory, or remembrance, and could not be subject to 
forgetfulness. How can we, answered they, give an account of things 
present, if we had no memory, but especially of things past, unrecorded, 
if we had no remembrance? Said the Empress, by present knowledge 
and understanding. The spirits answered, that present knowledge 
and understanding was of actions or things present, not of past. But, 
said the Empress, you know what is to come, without memory or 
remembrance, and therefore you may know what is past without memory 
and remembrance. They answered, that their foreknowledge was only a 
prudent and subtle observation made by a comparison of things or actions 
past, with those that are present, and that remembrance was nothing else 
but a repetition of things or actions past.56
The spirits are qualified to be the most knowledgeable beings in the account, 
having the power to cross temporal and spatial boundaries — yet even they 
are prone to lapses in memory. Their knowledge, as defined by memory, is not 
perfect. In prescribing the fallibility of memory to even the most perfect be-
ings in her utopia, Cavendish seems to be revising notions of temporality in 
knowledge construction and meaning-making to navigate a timeless and inter-
pretively open space, where forgetting is not intentional, but does not exist, or 
cannot occur, because past knowledge is not required for present knowledge.
Cavendish distinguishes between 1) giving an account of the present by 
means of the memory of things past, and 2) giving an account of the present 
based on present knowledge and understanding. This distinction is one that 
is crucial to our capacity to understand human progress in knowledge. The 
Empress posits what seems at first to be a tautology: just as the spirits know 
the future without memory or remembrance, they can know the past without 
memory, which the Oxford English Dictionary defines as “the faculty by which 
things are remembered; the capacity for retaining, perpetuating, or reviving 
the thought of things past.”57 However the Empress’s knowledge of the very 
history of paradise is founded on this idea, that one can know the past without 
direct memory or remembrance, in the same way that the Empress, and we, 
can know the history of Adam and Eve without having experienced that past 
first-hand — thus without having any memory/remembrance of it. One still 
remembers, not through first-hand memory, but through narrative and being a 
person inescapably layered with that past.
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The question is how knowledge is acquired or made if not through 
memory and forgetting, and whatever knowledge Cavendish is attempting to 
construct aspires to that vacancy. The spirits’ final answer involves a teleologi-
cal understanding of time, in which the past can be compared to the present 
to construct a projected future. Cavendish, on the other hand, subscribes to a 
perception of time as overlapping onto itself, as constantly referring back and 
forth, without regard for a linear progression or narrative. This is exemplified 
even in the topics the Empress chooses to discuss or inquire about, which have 
no logical progression. Rather, the lack of structure allows for an unbounded 
exploration of issues, free of temporal and spatial restrictions and comfortably 
outside the elements and measurements of actuality. 
The virtue to be had in Cavendish’s idea of temporality and her subse-
quent way of knowing is that it offers a freedom from history that allows her 
to explore the potential of a space or place — specifically, the creative potential 
of her paradise — by virtue of a new human interaction that imagines anew 
a redemptive narrative. From her entrance into paradise, the Empress has al-
ready been constructing a new paradise narrative, not because she has forgot-
ten about the history of paradise, in which she is implicated, but because that 
history never came into consideration. Her ignorance about the history of the 
space she currently inhabits makes the epistemological problems of paradise 
irrelevant to her narrative and to her new place. Her “return” to paradise places 
her status above that of the first couple, who fell and lost their privileges of 
occupying and ruling their original place, making her new paradise a utopic 
and uchronic space where her curiosity and desire for knowledge are allowed 
and satisfied.
“The sense of place,” Tuan asserts, “is perhaps never more acute than 
when one is homesick, and one can only be homesick when one is no longer at 
home.”58 Marina Leslie argues that as Cavendish’s heroines, the Empress and the 
Duchess, keep trying to return home, “each struggles to calculate the distance 
between what they know, what they imagine, and where they are.”59 While I 
agree in the main with Leslie’s articulation of the tensions between identity 
and place, I think that Cavendish manages also to experiment with reimag-
ining “home,” leaving us with drastically differing images between Godwin’s 
and Cavendish’s narratives of their protagonists’ relationship to and interaction 
with the new Paradise space and their native countries. 
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Godwin’s Gonsales is constantly in a state of coming and going; he arrives 
at his paradises, then leaves. We are ultimately left with Gonsales in China, back 
to earth from the moon but far from his home in his native Spain and in the 
process of attempting to figure out how to return. His homesickness prevents 
him from establishing a home anywhere else. In a sense, we end with Gonsales 
once again in transition, much in the way we were introduced to him in the 
frontispiece: in transition between earth and sky, origin and destination. As 
we leave him, he is perpetually stuck in travel, which Tuan defines as “to lose 
place, to be placeless and have, instead, merely scenes and images.”60 Because 
Gonsales never actually returns home in his account, he is left making grand 
promises, gesturing to the potential of some point in humanity’s future, the 
sincerity of which is compromised by the unpromising circumstances of his 
situation in China, where we leave him.
Cavendish’s final place, on the other hand, is her created place; through 
creation her home becomes paradise, and paradise becomes her home. The 
Empress’s native place, her place of origin, is discarded in favour of paradise, 
and the place of her belonging is transferred to a reconfiguration of the original 
human space: paradise itself is redefined because of her presence. Rather than 
her history and her place of origin defining home, the Empress’s presence and 
present narrative transform her new place into her home. As a woman, and as 
an exile, Cavendish sees the potential in the utopic and uchronic sensibility of 
creativity to provide a space for women to be involved in and own the process 
of original knowledge construction, and she finds this space to be an inter-
nal, virtual space free from the limitations of the historical(ly authenticated). 
It must be through the manipulation of time and space, selective forgetting 
and erasing to create anew, that Cavendish opens up an unknowability within 
which to begin, and belong, again.
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